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Abstract 
This paper critically examines the framing of historical knowledge in 
the primary and 'broad general education' phases (ages 4-14) of 
Scotland's Curriculum for Excellence.  The paper focuses on curriculum 
documentation, particularly the curriculum’s aims and ‘Experiences 
and Outcomes and evaluates these in light of recent research on 
children’s historical understanding.  It is argued that the decision to 
frame historical understanding as 'People, Past Events and Societies' 
within the context of a 'social studies' curriculum area has been 
motivated by a misunderstanding of history's unique disciplinary 
identity.  It is argued that history curricula must take account of the 
unique ontological and epistemological challenges posed by 
investigating the past and that by failing to do this, ‘Curriculum for 
Excellence’ offers children in Scotland a problematic representation of 
what it means to study the past.   
The paper challenges the curriculum in both epistemic and 
pedagogical terms, before suggesting that a rigorous study of history 
as a discipline can make a valuable contribution to children’s personal 
and social development. 
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Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence (CfE) has an ambivalent relationship with the subject of history. 
While history is recognised as a discrete subject at the so-called ‘senior’ phase (ages 14-19), students 
in primary school (4-11) and during the ‘broad general education’ phase (11-14) of their education are 
instead offered an ‘organiser’ known as ‘People, Past Events and Societies’ (PPES) within a broader 
‘social studies’ course.  This decision to avoid the word ‘history’ in the early phase of high school 
represents a continuation of the approach taken by the previous version of the Scottish curriculum 
(Curriculum 5-14) which referred to ‘People in the Past’ in the context of ‘Environmental Studies’. 
The reason for these lexical innovations is not entirely clear, but the existence of ‘social subjects’ or 
‘social studies’ seems designed to encourage, albeit implicitly, the teaching of an integrated 
approach to History, Geography and Modern Studies. Elsewhere, Curriculum for Excellence explicitly 
encourages ‘greater cross-subject activity’ (Scottish Executive, 2004, p. 4) and insists that ‘the  
curriculum  should  include  space  for  learning  beyond  subject  boundaries,  so  that children and 
young people can make connexions between different areas of  learning (Scottish Government, 2008 
p.21).  However, progress towards this aim has been uneven; while effective interdisciplinary 
projects exist (Fenwick, et al., 2013), most schools have avoided the challenges posed by thorough 
integration (Priestley, 2009), preferring in most cases to teach discrete subjects, sometimes on a rota 
basis within a timetabled social subjects slot. 
 
This paper will argue that the inclusion of PPES within a broader ‘social studies’ curriculum area has 
been badly conceived.  This is not to argue that history ought not, or cannot, be part of an integrated 
social studies curriculum, but that where such an approach is favoured curriculum designers must 
understand the unique disciplinary contribution that history makes to a child’s education. History 
matters because it transforms a child’s perceptions through exposure to the unfamiliar and rigorous 
engagement with evidence.  In CfE, history takes an instrumental role; providing examples for the 
wider curricular aims of understanding democracy and evaluating sources. CfE understands history’s 
contribution to social subjects dimensionally – the past as shining light on the present. 
The tension between two competing imperatives (cross-curricular learning and the disciplinary 
integrity of history) is not recognised by CfE, with the result that PPES has a split identity – looking 
inwards towards the other ‘social subjects’ and outwards towards its progenitor discipline of history.  
Curriculum for Excellence fails to recognise the profundity of this split and so throws together two 
contradictory visions of the purpose of school history: as an aid to socialisation and self-actualisation 
on the one hand, and as an epistemic frame for uncovering and recounting the past on the other.  
These visions are ontologically mutually exclusive: one prizing historical knowledge for its extrinsic 
utility, the other a commitment to the pursuit of objectivity. Since CfE fails to ask fundamental 
questions of the nature and limitations of historical truth, it valorises the subjective truth of identity 
formation within a notional framework of ‘historical understanding’ without acknowledging their 
mutual incompatibility.  This paper is best seen, therefore, as a case-study contribution to the debate 
opened by Priestley and Humes (2010) who accused CfE of being ‘incoherently structured and 
contain[ing] epistemological and pragmatic contradictions’ (p 355). 
This paper will begin with a summary of the debates over the nature and purpose of history in schools 
and will pay special attention to the oft-misunderstood ‘disciplinary’ approach which now dominates 
in many countries. There will then follow a short account of the introduction of Curriculum for 
Excellence and the place of historical learning within it.  The analysis section of the paper will work at 
the intersection of these two fields, critically evaluating the model of progression presented by the 
curriculum in light of current knowledge about how children make sense of the past. It will be argued 
that the fundamental weakness of the CfE approach is its failure to ask ontological questions about 
the possibility of historical truth and that other problems are merely a corollary of this original error. 
Consequently, analysis of the curriculum will take place at three levels: ontological, epistemological 
and pedagogical.  The paper is a critical analysis of policy documents and makes no claims to 
knowledge about current practice in schools. Inevitably, there is a considerable implementation gap 
between policy and practice and so we should be careful about inferring that what happens on paper 
is what happens in the classrooms. But policy does shape the language that is used to talk about 
practice, it shapes expectations and exercises a powerful influence over resourcing. Therefore, while 
this paper uses no empirical claims about practice in schools, it does discuss examples where 
apparently ahistorical practice in schools might be implicitly endorsed. 
Purposes of school history 
If, as in Alfred Whitehead’s famous aphorism, all philosophy is footnotes to Plato, then all discussion 
of the purpose of history might be seen as footnotes to Nietzsche.  In On the Use and Abuse of History 
for Life (1874), Nietzsche offers us three motivations for studying the past (each of which he 
subsequently dismisses).  The first is “monumental” history, the use of history to hearten oneself in 
weaker moments with “the knowledge that [a] great thing existed and was therefore possible, and so 
may be possible again” (p. 3.2). The second is “antiquarian” which is “necessary to the man of 
conservative and reverent nature who looks back to the origins of his existence with love and trust”. 
For the antiquarian, the past reveals his identity as though, “the history of the town becomes the 
history of himself” (p. 4.3). Finally, “critical history” is history written by “he whose heart is oppressed 
by an instant need [for]….the history that judges and condemns” (p. 4.2)  Characteristically, 
Nietzsche’s objections to these three schools are moral: he feels that a preoccupation with the past 
limits the capacity or the will to act. However, without subscribing to a Nietzschean world view, it is 
still possible to read these as contributions to contemporary debates on the purposes of school 
history. 
Nietzsche’s ‘monumental history’ is analogous to the argument that history provides a store of 
valuable examples and lessons with which children ought to be familiar.  These examples form the 
shared cultural capital of a society and so aid social cohesion and social mobility (see Hirsch, 1987).  
Nietzsche’s ‘antiquarian’ history, on the other hand, is related, but contains the additional dimension 
of internalisation, history aids the formation of the self, the creation of identity (often one informed 
by nationhood).  These ideas are often erroneously associated exclusively with the political right, but 
such ideas cut across political distinctions. What unites these viewpoints is not politics, but the 
instrumentalisation of the past. The idea that the past exists in shared stories with self-evident lessons 
which shape us all and which should, in turn, be used to shape children. This shaping should not 
necessarily carry overtones of indoctrination, but even in its weakest form - that history should ‘fit 
[children] to be citizens of a liberal-democratic society’ (White, 1992, p. 19) - it still underpinned by 
political and ethical assumptions about the lessons of the past. 
Nietzsche’s monumental and antiquarian history might be said, therefore, to form the core of the 
‘traditionalist’ defence of a history education1 which is often counterposed with a disciplinary (or often 
simply ‘new’) approach to the subject.  The disciplinary approach is much misunderstood, often being 
presented as Nietzschean ‘critical history’ – an attempt to be subversive, contrary or just ‘trendy’ (see 
Partington, 1986; Kedourie, 1988; McGovern, 2007). These are, however, fundamental (and possibly 
wilful) misunderstandings. Instead, as the next section explains, a disciplinary approach to school 
history is an epistemological – not political – position. 
History Education as Disciplinary Knowledge 
Many areas of the world now take a disciplinary approach to the teaching of the past which states 
simply that children ought to be inducted to history both as a body of knowledge and as a ‘way of 
knowing’ (Wineberg, 2001).  The fashion in public discourse has been to speak in terms of a ‘skills- 
approach’ in opposition to a ‘content approach’, but this is an unhelpful framing of the debate in which 
skills become disembodied ends in themselves rather than the very fabric of the discipline.  Instead, 
history educators prefer the terms substantive knowledge (to know that) and procedural knowledge 
(to know how) (Lévesque, 2008). This approach - which has its roots in the work of Janet Coltham and 
John Fines (1971) and the English Schools Council History Project (1976) - has informed curricula across 
the world; including England (Counsell, 2011), New Zealand (Ormond, 2011) and Canada (Seixas & 
Morton, 2013). In each of these countries procedural concepts (such as causation, chronology, 
change) act as curriculum organisers, aspects of historical knowledge that children can deepen and 
develop. This does not mean that substantive knowledge has diminished status in these curricula – 
each country still details events that it deems significant - but there is a shared recognition that 
substantive knowledge on its own provides no scope for progression. Since it is not inherently more 
challenging to understand one event than another, school curricula must be based on ‘progression’ in 
                                                          
1 The seemingly neutral traditionalist appeal for ‘history for its own sake’ was famously skewered by John 
Slater who asked simply “who is the ‘it’ on whose behalf history is learnt? Someone other than the learner or 
the historian? Clio perhaps? Alas, she does not exist” (1992b, p. 47).   
procedural knowledge rather than substantive. Counsell (2011) makes this point when she describes 
procedural concepts as ‘the most efficient device we have for defining the structure of the discipline 
in curricular terms’ (p. 217).   
The ubiquity of this approach is not the result of pedagogical fashion or of producer capture, but is 
instead an inevitable consequence of ontological questions at the heart of history. A history curriculum 
can never ask children simply ‘to learn what happened’ for at least two reasons: because not 
everything that happened can be learnt, and because agreement on what happened is not guaranteed 
(Lee, 1991, p. 40).  Consequently, a traditional narrative approach to the subject is unsatisfying. Equally 
unsatisfying, however, is a relativist approach to the subject which has no faith in ‘truth’ or 
‘objectivity’; just because an infinite number of accounts are possible, this must not mean that all 
accounts are equally valid.  Once these unhappy ontological poles are accepted, the historical 
discipline becomes – for pupils as much as professional historians – a question of how to assess the 
validity of accounts and of how to form more valid accounts.  Thus, as Evans (1999) argues, while 
‘objectivity’ might be an ontologically impossible aspiration, it remains very satisfactory guiding 
principles for the discipline. This is not the same as the naïve Rankean injunction to ‘tell it how it was’ 
but a more modest faith that the historical method is the best tool currently available for investigating 
what happened in the past. 
Once this ontological reasoning is accepted, ‘learning about the past means learning about the 
discipline too’ (Lee, 1991, p. 44).  Procedural concepts emerge because ‘historians often share a large 
measure of agreement about what questions are worth asking at any particular moment, because 
they share explanatory ideas which change rather slowly’ (p45). Lee’s views here are prefiguring the 
social realist turn in the sociology of education, which argues that legitimate knowledge is determined 
by codes of association which are “enshrined in institutions such as university subject 
departments… specialist academic organisations… and school subject associations” (Young, 
2008a, p. 32). Thus, the disciplinary approach to school history is best understood in social realist 
terms wherein procedural concepts give credibility and legitimacy to certain kinds of historical 
enquiry.  For example, the questions ‘Why did World War One occur?’ and ‘How did democracy 
develop in Britain?’ have more conceptual value (in terms of causation and change, respectively) than, 
say, ‘How many soldiers fought at Rorke’s Drift?’ This is not to say that history in schools and history 
in academia should be indistinguishable - plainly this would be absurd - it is merely to state that history 
in schools must have a disciplinary dimension. As Lee writes,  
‘The ability to recall accounts without any understanding of the problems involved in 
constructing them or the criteria in evaluating them has nothing historical about it. 
Without an understanding of what makes an account historical, there is nothing to 
distinguish it from the ability to recite sagas, legends, myths or poems’ (Lee, 1991, pp. 
48-49). 
This definition of historical knowledge in disciplinary terms has had a number of positive implications 
for teachers of history.  Perhaps most importantly, it has afforded a compelling justification for 
history’s place in the school curriculum (Lee, 1991; 1992). The school curriculum is a fiercely politicised 
arena in which special interest groups compete to have their voices included (Foster & Crawford, 2006; 
Taylor & Guyver, 2011).  Arguably, a disciplinary/ social realist conception of the subject provides a 
way of depoliticising history’s place in the curriculum. The recent debate over the National Curriculum 
in England has shown how a disciplinary defence of the subject has enabled history teachers to resist 
politically-motivated selection of content (Smith, 2015). In the words of Counsell disciplinary 
knowledge is the ‘best hope we have of dealing with the problem of the canon’ since it teaches ‘the 
processes of knowledge construction [so that] pupils can challenge the canon itself’ (2011, p. 218).  
This does not mean that the question of selection of content is somehow divorced from questions of 
power, but it does provide a framework wherein common sense assumptions that a particular event 
is ‘significant’ or ‘worthy of study’ are subjected to critical examination.  
The second gain from a social realist conception of the subject is the way in which it has provided a 
framework in which to analyse children’s historical understanding: it is clear that many children find 
history difficult, but it is only when we are absolutely clear what ‘history’ expects of children that we 
can begin to explain this difficulty. The work of Denis Shemilt (1983) and Project CHATA (Lee & Ashby, 
2000) amongst others have allowed historians to see difficulties in children’s thinking, but also 
establish a hierarchy of historical understanding which points to something more than mere Piagetian 
maturation.  This research has therefore allowed history teachers to ask the educationally vital 
question ‘What does it mean to get better at history?’  Crucially, such research has been 
epistemologically inductive – analysing children’s explanations for the past, rather than attempting to 
scaffold these. Inevitably, such research has not always survived contact with designers of national 
curricula who – driven by demands for assessment models – favour objectives or statements of 
competence. Consequently, in many countries, these broad statements about ‘what it means to get 
better at history’ have regrettably morphed into endlessly subdivided levels of competence.   
We turn now to the specific case of the status of historical education in Scotland’s Curriculum for 
Excellence. In their analysis of the curriculum as a whole, Priestley and Humes (2010) argue that ‘there 
is hardly any mention of the big philosophical and sociological questions which… are necessary 
precursor to planning a curriculum’ (p. 354). It will be argued that what is true at the overarching 
curriculum level is also true at the level of individual subjects.  
The place of ‘History’ in Scottish education 
In Scotland, the question of whether the ‘social subjects’ should be integrated or taught as discrete 
subjects has a long history (McGonigle, 1999). In general, these debates have generated more heat 
than light and have invariably resulted in compromise – a recognition that ‘social subjects’ have much 
in common, but a simultaneous recognition of their distinctive identity.  It was only in the late 1980s 
as a National Curriculum was proposed in England, that Scotland produced a national framework of 
practice. Curriculum 5-14, as it became known, was implemented between 1991 and 1993. Setting a 
precedent that would be repeated in Curriculum for Excellence, history had no distinctive identity; 
instead it was to be taught as an aspect of ‘Environmental Studies’ (SOED, 1993). 
Devolution provided a natural opportunity for Scotland to review its approach to the curriculum. 
Beginning with a discussion paper in 2004, Curriculum for Excellence was conceived at a time when 
interdisciplinary approaches to learning were growing in popularity worldwide.  The popularity of 
these approaches can be attributed to economic imperatives – a growing demand that children should 
be prepared to be the workers of the twenty-first century (Young, 2008b) (Young & Muller, 2010). This 
transnational agenda, together with Scotland’s existing practice of teaching ‘environmental studies’, 
made it likely that history would not feature as a distinct subject in the new curriculum.  This suspicion 
was reinforced when, in 2005, the then Scottish education minister, Peter Peacock, said of history 
"perhaps we will not be teaching it in the same way in a timetabled slot marked history, but as a 
contributor to broader forms of learning” (Munro, 2005). This prompted an inevitable backlash from 
those who sought to defend the subject’s place and led to a retraction in which Peacock clarified that 
he ‘was quite clear that history, as a distinct discipline, has a hugely important role to play’ (cited in 
(Henry, 2006, p. 34)). 
The question of exactly what this ‘hugely important role’ was has never been satisfactorily answered. 
When it seemed that history as a subject would be under threat the Scottish Association of History 
Teachers (SATH) issued a statement which asserts the subject’s worth in socio-cultural rather than 
disciplinary terms: 
“Let me say, unequivocally and unashamedly, that SATH will continue to advocate the central 
importance of history in the curriculum, not because we refuse to be outward looking or 
innovative in developing the curriculum, but because we believe that as Scotland develops as a 
country with its own Parliament in the twenty-first century, it is essential that its young people 
have a sense of their heritage and identity” (Henry, 2006, p. 35) 
In this way, history’s importance was asserted, but unhistorical concepts such as ‘heritage’ and 
‘identity’ were foregrounded.  This defence of history - valuable and passionate though it is - misses 
an opportunity to assert history's disciplinary uniqueness.  Echoing Lee (1992), it could be suggested 
that although Henry provides a compelling reason for students to learn about Scotland’s past, there is 
no explicit reason given why this should be studied through a school subject called history.  
In fact, the absence of the word ‘history’ became something of leitmotif as curriculum development 
progressed. A Curriculum for Excellence: Progress and Proposals (Scottish Government, 2006a) 
retained the label of ‘social studies’ from Curriculum 5-14 and spoke of ‘learning in historical… 
contexts’ within that (p. 14).   Later in the same year Building the Curriculum 1(Scottish Government, 
2006b), labelled this strand ‘People in the Past’ (a further borrowing from Curriculum 5-14) which later 
became ‘People, Past events and societies’ in Curriculum for Excellence: Experiences and Outcomes  
(Learning and Teaching Scotland, 2008). Peter Hillis spoke for many history teachers when he 
complained, ‘it is disappointing that curriculum planners persist with “education speak” which refuses 
to use the word History’ (Hillis, 2008, p. 497). 
However, the absence of the word history meant more than simple rebranding, as the expectation of 
interdisciplinary learning in social studies remained. Referring to the three ‘organisers’, of which PPES 
was one, Experiences and Outcomes asserted they ‘recognise the special contribution made by each 
of the social subjects’ but also ‘provide children and young people with opportunities for effective 
interdisciplinary working by making connections across and between subject boundaries’ (Learning 
and Teaching Scotland, 2008, p. 279). However, the purposes of ‘social studies’ are treated holistically 
and the ‘special contribution’ of ‘People, Past Events and Societies’ is never developed. Of the ten 
broad aims identified for social studies, PPES contributes to the first six. These are 
1. develop my understanding of the history, heritage and culture of Scotland, and an appreciation 
of my local and national heritage within the world  
2. broaden my understanding of the world by learning about human activities and achievements 
in the past and present  
3. develop my understanding of my own values, beliefs and cultures and those of others  
4. develop my understanding of the principles of democracy and citizenship through experience 
of critical and independent thinking  
5. explore and evaluate different types of sources and evidence  
6. learn how to locate, explore and link periods, people and events in time and place 
 
Of these, only aim 6 is distinctively historical, the others take a broad area of study; human 
achievement, say, and ask students to broaden their understanding through a range of dimensions, 
for example, past and present, time and place.    
Somewhat intriguingly, Education Scotland (the successor to Learning and Teaching Scotland) released 
further guidance on assessment in 2013 which complicated the picture further by identifying 
‘significant aspects of learning’ (Education Scotland, 2013). Although this document stated the 
significant aspects of learning in the social studies were ‘derived from the rationale in the principles 
and practice paper’, there was a noticeable shift to a more disciplinary way of thinking. For example, 
students were now expected to become ‘aware of change, cause and effect, sequence and 
chronology’ and the word ‘maps’ appeared for the first time.  Although these changes are welcome 
from a disciplinary perspective, it is not clear how the differing emphases between the Experiences 
and Outcomes and the Significant Aspects of Learning are to be reconciled. 
Analysis 
Having traced the origins of ‘People, past events and societies’ in Curriculum for Excellence and also 
adumbrated the disciplinary approach to history teaching, I turn now to a comparison between the 
two. In certain key respects, as will be seen, CfE borrows heavily from the disciplinary tradition, but it 
does so in ways that are educationally unsatisfying. This analysis will look first at the problematic 
ontology which underpins the study of the past in CfE, before showing how these initial errors 
contribute to less significant (though more numerous) epistemic and pedagogical ones. 
Furthermore, it will be shown that where attention is paid to the disciplinary nature of the subject, 
there is limited and confused understanding of what constitutes progression in children’s 
understanding of the past. In this respect, the paper supports Priestley and Humes’ (2010) partially-
substantiated contention that ‘there are multiple instances where progression and/or continuity 
between levels is haphazard (p. 357). 
Ontological Errors 
Clearly, historical ontology is an enormously complex field: since the past has no tangible existence it 
is uncontroversial to argue that accounts of the past are constructs of those who write them. However, 
historians working in the western tradition argue that methodological rigour can allow them to 
construct better quality accounts of the past. These accounts seek to make their truth claims 
accountable to the reader through the architecture of footnotes and authorial honesty – in this way, 
historians operate as community of practice committed to the pursuit of truth, while accepting that 
they too, are part of the historical process.  Such a compromise has not been enough to assuage the 
ontological doubts of committed post-modernists, among them Keith Jenkins (1991), for whom these 
‘rules of verification’ are little more than a Barthesian ‘reality effect’. 
However, history is not as blindly positivist as some of its critics imply. The purpose of history is not 
the pursuit of a single all-encompassing grand-narrative, but the more modest acceptance that the 
past is in some sense knowable to the extent that it is possible to judge the quality or accuracy of a 
given account of the past. Potter and Lopez’s summary of critical realism in social science has a neat 
parallel in the historian’s ambitions,   
“The production of knowledge is a social process… However knowledge cannot be reduced to its 
sociological determinants of production. Truth is relative, to be sure, but there is still both truth 
and error (as well as lies!)’ (2001, p. 9). 
To history teachers of a disciplinary persuasion, schooling children in the historical method does not 
represent a faith that the historical method is infallible; quite the opposite, it is precisely because our 
knowledge of the past is partial, nuanced and contingent that we must understand the processes 
through which historical accounts are constructed.  Nevertheless, to study history is to take an ethical 
position: in Lee's words, “commitment to truth, respect for the past… and impartiality are built into 
learning history’ (1991, p. 51).   
In Curriculum for Excellence, we see the potential pitfalls of abandoning this ethical starting point – 
the danger that the past might be plundered and instrumentalised in ways that are not historically 
valid which then, in turn, leads to problems conceptualising and teaching the past. 
Consider the following expectation of progression for students: 
Third I can make links between my current and previous studies, and show my understanding 
of how people and events have contributed to the development of the Scottish nation. 
SOC 3-02a 
Fourth I have developed a sense of my heritage and identity as a British, European or global citizen 
and can present arguments about the importance of respecting the heritage and identity 
of others. SOC 4-02a 
 
Firstly, it is immediately obvious that the fourth level does not constitute a progression of the third. 
The third level has a clear conceptual focus – encouraging children to study development over time, 
what might conceptually be called historical change.  The outcome might be criticised by some for its 
nationalist scope, but it is, nonetheless, what one might consider a legitimate historical enquiry.  
However, it is not at all clear how or why the fourth level might be considered an extension of the 
third.  The immediate answer is dimensional - the broadening of scope (from Scotland at the third 
level to British, European and Global) in the fourth - but a closer analysis shows why this ‘progression’ 
is inadequate. 
At the fourth level (though not at the third) the problematic term ‘heritage’ is introduced.  In everyday 
use, heritage and history may be considered linked, but any notion of heritage is necessarily 
antagonistic to the historical method.  David Lowenthal (1997) has been at the forefront of theorising 
this distinction, where ‘heritage’ makes a ‘weapon’ of history. It uses the past to support or oppose 
interests in the present and is not subject to critique but is held as ‘a dogma of roots and origins which 
must be accepted on faith’ (p. 2). Heritage might be defined as the inherited culture of previous 
generations, and culture is no respecter of evidence.   
The specific case of Scottish identity has been given particularly acerbic deconstruction by Hugh 
Trevor-Roper (1983, 2008) who assembles arguments made earlier by Hay and Telfer Dunbar, to argue 
that many of the apparent shibboleths of ‘traditional’ Scottish culture – such as the kilt and the 
bagpipes – were nineteenth century appropriations.  These cultural manifestations are of interest to 
a historian; telling, as they do, the story of how a distinctive Scottish culture was reasserted in the 
century after the Union of the Crowns.  Although it is perfectly possible to teach the historical 
construction of these ‘ancient’ traditions – and schools no doubt already do this – by using the terms 
‘heritage’ and ‘identity’, the curriculum allows pupils to emphasise tradition over the rigour of the 
historical method.  No doubt it could be argued that this is a ‘social studies’ curriculum and not a 
history curriculum – but these two subjects have very different aims. One aims to make sense of the 
society to which the pupil belongs, the other to ask question about how we can know about the past.  
In one arena, tradition, myth and heritage are essential content; in the other, they are problematic 
narratives.  In the words of Peter Lee, “Handing on a common heritage is nothing to do with learning 
history… This kind of practical past is not necessarily illegitimate, but it is not to be confused with 
history” (1991, p. 41). 
Significantly, 4-02a not only expects children to develop their own identity, but also to ‘present 
arguments about the importance of respecting the heritage and identity of others’. This poses the 
question of whether another’s sense of ‘heritage’ or ’identity’ should be respected uncritically or 
whether they should be subject to historical scrutiny?  John Slater is characteristically nuanced on this 
point: history ‘not only helps us to understand the identities of our communities, cultures, nations by 
knowing something of the past, but also enables our loyalties to them to be moderated by informed 
and responsible scepticism’ (1989, p. 16). Although a sense of identity is an important outcome of a 
historical education, it must not be divorced from the falsifiability tests to which all historical 
narratives are subject. 
It is important to respect others’ identities as CfE reminds us, but it is equally – perhaps more – 
important to respect evidence and to challenge those identities (including one’s own) which are based 
on historical falsehoods.  Do we wish children to respect the identity of a racist and his distorted sense 
of heritage? We would hope not, but if a commitment to historical accuracy is not central to an 
historical education, then one wonders where the tools will be found to counter him.  By including 
this outcome, CfE veers dangerously close to a kind of relativism based on a misreading of historical 
ontology wherein the accepted fact that no account can be ‘the truth’ is distorted to reward accounts 
for the extent to which they are 'true to the pupil', rather than for their ability to withstand scrutiny. 
Priestley and Humes’ (2010) criticised the phrasing of the Es and Os as ‘I can’ statements by writing 
‘the subjectivity of the experiences is misleading, an artifice devised by the planners rather than a true 
reflection of the learning process' (p.353). However, in the specific case of ‘identity’ the subjectivity is 
real and disturbingly so. This is not to say that the subjective or personal has no place in a historical 
education. History must emphasise the present as product of the past, the individual as both 
antecedent and change agent, lest it become in Slater’s words ‘a humanity dehumanised’ (Slater, p. 
13).  However, while the history teacher cannot and should not ‘sculpt’ a child’s identity, they are 
responsible for providing the tools of coherence, plausibility and empathy which the child might use. 
Unfortunately, empathy, too, is a problematic concept in Curriculum for Excellence. A very specific 
kind of empathy has to be at the heart of all historical thinking – it is the empathy which comprehends 
the world view of the historical actor and contextualises his/her actions within that world view.  This 
is, before all else, a historical endeavour and differs markedly from ‘empathy’ as commonly 
understood.  While both forms of empathy try to see the world from another’s point of view, historical 
empathy is complicated beyond all recognition by the strangeness of the past.  For this reason, 
historians have tried scrupulously to avoid the word, Collingwood (1946) developed the common idea 
of a ‘historical imagination’. Clearly ‘historical imagination’ leaves space to be misinterpreted too; 
Seixas and Peck (2004) have offered ‘historical perspective taking’, but this, too, is a little 
cumbersome.  It is doubtful that a suitably watertight single word actually exists for what Wineberg 
(2001) calls the ‘unnatural act’ of this kind of historical thinking.  
However, what unites these ideas is a recognition that mentally inhabiting the past requires 
considerable historical knowledge and that a reciprocal relationship exists between that knowledge 
and the affective dimension of empathy.  Historical empathy is not a skill that can be demonstrated, 
but a heuristic cycle in which imagination is informed by evidence, which in turn refines the 
imagination. Such reciprocity between the cognitive and affective domains is essential for the simple 
reason that our everyday imagination is a very poor guide to how people acted in the past.  Historical 
empathy can help us comprehend the unfamiliar, but no amount of unschooled imagination can help 
us inhabit the mind of the witch hunter or comprehend the internal logic of trial by ordeal.  Without 
careful consideration of context, we risk either bewilderment or condescension.  
The presentation of ‘empathy’ in CfE contains none of this refinement. The word itself (or rather a 
derivative) is used on just one occasion in the Es and Os. 
Fourth I can express an informed view about the changing nature of conflict over time, appreciate 
its impact and empathise with the experiences of those involved. SOC 4-06b 
 
The problem with this usage is readily apparent. Empathy is presented here as something students 
should do to understand the lives of people in extreme or emotionally challenging circumstances.  
Empathy in this conception ceases to be a component of historical thinking and becomes an exercise 
in understanding the afflicted. The danger, of course, is that this ceases even to be empathy in the 
loosest sense and veers into compassion or sympathy; Mitgefuhl over Einfuhlung.  More prosaically, 
it would stand to reason that the more extreme the circumstances the less reliable is common 
empathy as a guide to how others felt.  Recent historiography on the Great War demonstrates how 
soldiers were motivated to continue fighting by ‘old-fashioned’ notions of companionship, patriotism 
and a sense of duty (Holmes, 2005; Watson, 2009) which seem deliberately to resist our well-
intentioned twenty-first century empathy.   As Slater has argued, historical empathy may well have an 
important socialising function, ‘empathetic thinking may also, may it not, make us less likely to 
patronise our fellow human beings? It might, just, sometimes help us choke back mockery, give 
condemnation second thoughts… put a brake on violence, and if not in others, at least in ourselves’ 
(1989, p. 8). However, this socialising effect that Slater describes is perhaps better termed ‘humility’ 
rather than empathy. By seeing the past from the perspective of the past, children can avoid the 
arrogance of hindsight, the lures of presentism and the ‘condescension of posterity’ (Thompson, 
1963). This is empathetic understanding, to be sure, but only in the loosest sense associated with 
Maitland that ‘we should always be aware that what now lies in the past once lay in the future’. Slater 
values the transformative potential of empathy conceived thus, but he is emphatic that ‘this is not the 
same as identifying with people in the past’ (p. 7). 
Interestingly, a more accurate representation of what historians mean by empathy is to be found at a 
lower level, albeit in a slightly different ‘strand’. 
Third I can discuss the motives of those involved in a significant turning point in the past and 
assess the consequences it had then and since. SOC 3-06a 
 
This is an approach to empathy which Furlong (1961) describes as ‘supposal’, as opposed to ‘imaging 
in ’. At this level, historical empathy properly understood is a necessity; the child must understand the 
context of the decision as well as the factors binding the choice of actions for the person involved.  
There is a further dimension in which ‘empathy’ is important, since there is a need to comprehend 
how consequences have been perceived in the years since.  The pupil must empathise not just with 
the original decision taker, but also with the people affected later by the consequences of that 
decision.  This is a challenging and historically rigorous outcome grounded in historical empathy, it is 
simply confusing that the word is used so recklessly at the supposedly more challenging SOC 4-06b. 
Epistemological Errors 
Epistemological errors are always the corollary of ontological ones, but it is often at the epistemic level 
that these errors are most obvious.  To clarify the distinction: historical ontology must have as its 
starting point a belief that accounts can be more or less faithful to the past, historical epistemology 
provides the tools and approaches that historians use to discover this knowable past and to create 
accounts.  The importance of evidence in supporting historical claims and a competent and ethical use 
of source material is obviously integral to the pursuit of history – sources are the raw materials with 
which historians work. 
PPES seems to have an ambiguous relationship with ‘evidence’. Its importance is recognised by its 
being the first ‘strand’ of outcomes (SOC 0-001a to SOC 4-01a). Similarly, the primacy of evidential 
understanding is restated in the notes appended to the progression framework which stress that ‘this 
set of experiences and outcomes provides progression in the evaluation of sources and other historical 
evidences and can be used in conjunction with other outcomes’. However, this phrasing is, itself, 
troublesome for it seems not to appreciate the distinction between ‘source’ and ‘evidence’.  A ‘source’ 
is a relic or record of the past which takes on the status of ‘evidence’ once a historian uses it to support 
a claim.  Hence the phrase ‘sources and other historical evidences’ contains a redundancy – there are 
no evidences that were not at one time sources. 
Furthermore, the very words ‘Experience and Outcome’ invite a tick-box approach in which an 
experience can be ‘had’ or an outcome can be ‘met’.  Such an approach is wholly inappropriate to 
scaffolding the development in a child’s historical understanding.  For example, SOC 2-01a which is 
designed to be ‘met’ in at upper primary level reads, 'I can use primary and secondary sources 
selectively to research events in the past'.  It hardly bears mentioning that this is nothing more than a 
one-sentence description of the historical method in its entirety.  This is not an outcome that can be 
met, but a statement of competence which, if it can be measured at all, can be done so only 
qualitatively since the statement encompasses everything from a reductive ‘source work activity’ in 
the primary classroom to the production of a scholarly monograph in a university history faculty.  
Clearly, teachers will use their professional judgement to pitch lessons appropriately, but do we really 
want to create the impression that ‘using primary and secondary sources selectively’ is an experience 
that can be had and then moved on from? By relying on competencies to describe a qualitative 
attribute, the curriculum arrives at outcomes which are at once insultingly simplistic and unbelievably 
complex. 
Curricula are, by their very nature, epistemic devices – they frame and delimit knowledge and 
ontological and epistemological carelessness at the heart of curriculum planning has real effects in the 
classroom. By creating its own definition of progression, it shapes the activities and assessments that 
teachers plan and that pupils undertake.  The final section will look at how an ill-considered epistemic 
framing has pedagogical consequences. 
Pedagogical Errors 
To better understand the contradictions inherent in the progression framework, it is useful to turn to 
the three curriculum models advanced by A.V. Kelly (1999) and which Priestley and Humes (2010) 
deployed in their analysis of CfE. For Kelly, curriculum can function as either ‘content’, ‘product’ or 
‘process’ – the first of these specifies material to be mastered, the second objectives to be met and 
the third the mode of enquiry. Hence, process model would equip students with the epistemic tools 
to discover the past (what we have called procedural knowledge) while a product model would specify 
outcomes to be met.  However, the CfE progression model seems to cut across these in a way which 
betrays a lack of understanding rather than playful eclecticism.  The disciplinary approach to history 
teaching is firmly in the ‘process’ tradition – it argues that the subject consists of procedural concepts 
in which children can be inducted and can develop.  The progression framework seems at times 
amenable to this approach, for example, SOC1-01a to SOC 4-01a are notionally concerned with 
evidential understanding while SOC 1-04s to SOC 4-04 a/b demand understanding of historical 
diversity.  Such an approach does not suggest that historical understanding can be measured in 
atomised reductionist terms, but that the idea of ‘progression framework’ is not inherently 
antithetical to a disciplinary approach to children’s progression.  However, the progression model 
lacks even this coherence. Consider the following extract from the progression document: 
First - I can use evidence to recreate the story of a place or individual of local historical interest. (SOC 1-03a) 
 
Second - I can investigate a Scottish historical theme to discover how past events or the actions of individuals 
or groups have shaped Scottish society. (SOC 2.03a) 
 
Third – I can explain why a group of people from beyond Scotland settled here in the past and discuss the 
impact they have had on the life and culture of Scotland. (SOC 3.03a) 
 
There is simply no overarching logic to the three expectations which explains why each level 
represents progression from the previous one. While SOC 1-03a seems to expect narrative recall 
(which strictly speaking is not a historical concept anyway), SOC 2.03a visits Change and Continuity 
and Historical Significance. The inclusion of SOC 3.03a is even stranger since it represents not 
procedural knowledge, but substantive knowledge of the concept of migration. It is not even clear 
why SOC 3.03a is more challenging than SOC 2.03a, it is even more unclear how one can be considered 
to have ‘built on’ or progressed from the other.  This is not an isolated example. CfE superficially 
eschews prescription of content, but at the fourth level, the Es and Os seem to do little else.  
Consequently, 4-06b and 4-06c are recognisably about conflict, while  4-04a is about inequality, 4-04b 
ideas and beliefs, 4-04c democracy, 4-05b industrialisation and so on.  In this way a framework 
designed to indicate progression (an idea which ought really to be underpinned by a disciplinary 
conception of the subject), actually becomes a document for specifying content. The result is a 
document which sends strange signals about what it means ‘to get better’ at history. 
It is apparent that substantive concepts are specified principally at the fourth level, while procedural 
concepts appear throughout the levels. The effect is to imply that procedural knowledge as a precursor 
to substantive knowledge, where the latter is conceived of as more challenging, perhaps more akin to 
‘proper history’. Given the scope and depth of research into children’s understanding of the past (not 
least (Shemilt, 1983) (Lee & Ashby, 2000) (Howson & Shemilt, 2011)) this represents a serious lacuna 
in the planning for historical learning within CfE. As Priestly and Humes (2010) have argued, ‘there is 
no mention at all of the insights of research into the curriculum, whether from a philosophical, 
sociological or psychological standpoint (p358). 
The relatively low status accorded to procedural knowledge can be further gleaned from the narrow 
definitions applied.  Consider the curriculum’s explanation of children’s development of chronology 
from the appendix to the Es&Os: 
Chronology skills are developed progressively in a variety of contexts. The main stages of progression within 
these skills would be: sequencing evidence; creating sequences and timelines; locating events in sequence 
and time; representing situations before and after. SOC 2-06a  
 
Here chronology is defined purely as a sequencing exercise, the existence of a single timeline is 
assumed and the challenge for the student is to place events on the timeline. Such activities are clearly 
indispensable (Wood, 1995) and research has shown that children struggle with even these 
fundamentals (Blow, et al., 2012). However, a reliance on timelines is not a panacea; chronological 
understanding properly understood is much more than sequencing. Sequencing can be actively 
unhelpful for the way it reinforces the child's idea of the past a single narrative; rather than an 
interplay between short-term events and longer processes – if dates are all one needs, where does 
one place “growing importance of cotton” on a timeline of the Industrial Revolution?  Similarly, the 
language of periodization is central to chronological understanding and is neglected here but is hugely 
confusing to children.  At what point in their historical education are children to learn that “Stone 
Age,” “Early Modern” and “Restoration” are not concrete concepts, but labels whose durations and 
definitions differ between historians? 
Even if one accepts that such a narrow definition of chronology is appropriate for the early stages of 
a child’s education, there are very many examples in the progression framework of students at one 
level being asked to demonstrate an ability which they will not be taught until the next level. For 
example, SOC 2-02a reads ‘I can interpret historical evidence from a range of periods to help build a 
picture of Scotland’s heritage and my sense of chronology’. Yet, in terms of evidential understanding 
it is only at the third level (SOC 3-01a) that pupils ‘can use my [their] knowledge of a historical period 
to interpret the evidence and present an informed view’. Thus both outcomes ask pupils to ‘interpret 
evidence’, but at level two this must be a range of periods, while pupils at level three are asked to 
interpret evidence in relation to one period. While it could well be argued that the two enquiries are 
qualitatively different (one asks for depth, the other breadth), each relies on similar competencies and 
so it is not possible for children to achieve at the second level unless they have demonstrated a 
competency expected at the third. 
As stated earlier, this paper makes no claims to knowledge about current practice in schools, but 
assessment criteria have  a direct impact on  practice, and in doing so shape students’ consciousness 
of what a subject entails. As Priestley (2013) warned:  ‘It has become increasingly clear since 2010 that 
assessment against Es & Os will be major feature of teachers’ work within CfE [there has been] a shift 
in emphasis, making clear that the Es & Os are assessment standards’ (p. 32).  If, as I have argued here, 
there are serious concerns about the type of progression being outlined, then there will be 
concomitant concerns about the activities that teachers scaffold and the way that children’s historical 
thinking develops. 
Conclusion 
There is a current fashion in public discourse to conclude that a document is ‘unfit for purpose’, 
however such a dismissal is inappropriate in this instance because CfE has no clear statement of the 
purpose of ‘People, past events and societies’.  Subjects in CfE justify their position by the extent to 
which they can contribute to the four capacities: helping children to become successful learners, 
effective contributors, confident individuals and responsible citizens. A study of the past undoubtedly 
has a role to play in achieving all of these; however, it is critical to reflect on the obvious question of 
what exactly that role should be.   
It is frighteningly easy to put the past to use- the past is an endless repository of stories and examples 
which can inform confident individuals and responsible citizens, but can anyone put the past to use 
and do so in a way which is ethically and epistemologically honest? Perhaps at the root of the problem, 
is the characterisation of PPES as a 'social subject'. History is 'social' only insofar as it studies people 
and that societies are comprised of people. But this commonality with other social subjects is tenuous: 
most people in history differ from those in geography, modern studies or business by virtue of being 
dead.  To ignore this simple fact - that actors in the past can no longer speak for themselves and that 
historians are sense-makers creating accounts from relics and records, is to ignore what makes 
studying the past such a unique disciplinary endeavour.  That CfE does not appreciate the profundity 
of this simple fact can be seen in the very title of People, Past Events and Societies - why do 'events' 
and 'societies' justify adjectival modification whereas 'people' does not? The need to maintain 
consistency of naming across the social subjects is not sufficient justification, historians study people 
in the past and a very specific kind of epistemology is needed to do so. Once history is conceived as a 
social subject, it is perilously close to being reimagined as a socialising subject. 
In Lee’s famous phrase, “the reason for teaching history is not that it changes society, but it changes 
pupils; it changes what they see in the world and how they see it” (1991, p. 43 Emphasis in original).  
History can contribute to the four capacities: it helps humans to orientate themselves in time and so 
broadens their perspectives; by realising that other worlds were once possible and so opening the 
imagination to what worlds might be possible. However, before all else, history is a set of mental 
dispositions. It is a commitment to truth, it is a promise to view the past with understanding rather 
than condescension, it is a recognition that the human world is forever in flux and that injustice is 
upsetting but impermanent.  These are the lessons that an epistemologically sound study of the past 
offers.  Are these not, in themselves, a sufficient contribution to the four capacities? 
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